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THE EXTENSION OF WARRANTY PROTECTION
TO LEASE TRANSACTIONS
The warranty provisions' of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
are specifically applicable to sales transactions.2 It is obvious that a lease or
bailment for hire,2
 which merely transfers possession for a rental charge, does
not comply with the Code's definition of a sale. The purposes of this comment
are to analyze pre-Code precedents and the Code itself to ascertain whether
the Code's provisions and policies are consistent with extending warranty
protection to meet those consumer needs created by the growth of leasing
concerns,4 and to determine under what circumstances it is appropriate that
warranty coverage be afforded to the lessee. The conflict between the appli-
cation of strict liability in tort and the Code warranties will also be examined.
I. THE CODE WARRANTIES
The presence of warranties affords a consumer a basis for relief when he
receives unsuitable merchandise. The warranties imposed by the Code are
of both an express and an implied nature. Section 2-313 asserts that affirma-
tions of fact create express warranties if they "are part of the basis of the
bargain." This Code section does not change in substance the comparable
provision of the prior codification of sales law, the Uniform Sales Act.. 2 The
basic distinction is that under the U.S.A. there had to be proof of inducement
before warranty liability arose, while the Code seems to have eliminated the
element of "particular reliance." 6 Commentators have noted that at best a
1 The sales warranties are found in U.C.C. §§ 2-312 through 2-318. Unless otherwise
indicated, all Uniform Commercial Code references are to the 1962 Official Text.
2 U.C.C. § 2-106(1) notes "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price."
3 In U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2, the term "bailment for hire" is used. The precise
meaning of this term is in doubt. Legal sources have used "bailment for hire" and "lease"
interchangeably to mean the rental of a chattel for a price. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 449-52, 212 A.2d 769, 777-78 (1965); L. Vold,
Law of Sales, § 4 (1931); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases,
57 Colum. L. Rev. 653, 655 (1957). However, there is authority which distinguishes a lease
from a bailment for hire on the basis that, while in a lease the lessor charges a fee for the
use of his property, the bailment for hire is a contract in which the bailor for hire agrees
to pay an adequate recompense for the safe-keeping of the thing intrusted to the custody
of the bailee for hire. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 179-50 (4th ed. 1951) ; 2 Hals-
bury's Laws of England 114 (3d ed. 1953). It is submitted that this distinction between a
lease and a bailment for hire is antiquated and overly technical, but that, in any event,
the Code warranty provisions can be extended to leases under appropriate circumstances.
4 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212 A.2d 769,
776 (1965) took judicial notice of the expansion of leasing establishments. No section of
the Code expressly prohibits the extension of warranties to leases.
5 Uniform Sales Act § 12 states:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to in-
duce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goads relying
thereon...
U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3 asserts, "[A]ffirmations of fact made by the seller about
the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence
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fine line separates "part of the basis of the bargain" from actual reliance.'
Moreover, it is unclear, because "basis of the bargain" has no legal meaning,
whether the Code meant to change the existing law by the change in lan-
guage. 8
 It would seem that the significance of the Code's variation lies only
in the proof of the breach of an express warranty. Statements of the seller
made during a bargain are presumed to be part of the description of the goods
and are incorporated into the fabric of the agreement. Clear affirmative proof
must be presented by the seller in order to obviate this presumption. 9
Section 2-314 imposes upon sellers, if they are merchantsl° with respect
to goods of that kind, certain warranties which are not dependent upon the
agreement of the parties. It is noted that the development of these implied
warranties of merchantability, which first began to emerge in the early nine-
teenth century, reflected a changing social attitude toward the seller's re-
sponsibility." The comments to section 2-314 note that, in the absence of a
disclaimer, "The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically on
the meaning of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade.” 12
Unlike the U.S.A., the Code sets forth detailed standards for merchantability. 13
Section 2-315 provides a warranty of fitness for the particular purpose
when a buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting suitable
goods. Of note, it is not necessary that the seller be a merchant as in section
2-314." The buyer's reliance, the key element to be considered, need not be
expressed to the seller so long as the seller has reason to realize the pur-
poses intended or that the reliance exists.'° If not excluded or modified,
no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the
fabric of the agreement. • ."
7 R. Duesenberg and L. King, 3 Sales	 Bulk Transfers Under the U.C.C.	 6.01
(1966) ; Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litigation in New England:
The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 19 Me. L. Rev. 181, 201 (1967).
8 1 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform Commercial
Code 392-93 (1955).
9 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
10 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) states:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in the goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the prac-
tices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may
be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
11 W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 653 (3d ed. 1964).
12 U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 2.
13 U.C.C.	 2-314(2) indicates that to be merchantable goods must be such as at
least
pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and .. . in
the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and . . . are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
. run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and • . . are
adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may require; and
. .. conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
14 U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 4.
15 U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1.
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"Whether or not this warranty arises in any individual case is basically a
question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the contracting." 16
Section 2-315 represents a change from the U.S.A.'s provisions 17 in this area,
particularly in eliminating the requirement that the buyer's reliance be known
to the seller.
Section 2-316 provides that language of disclaimer inconsistent with
express warranties will not be given legal effect."' The means by which
implied warranties may be excluded or modified are also set forth. Basically,
the approach is one of notice in a consensual situation: any disclaimer must
be put clearly before the buyer.' 9 In order to exclude or modify an implied
warranty, the Code requires that the language be "conspicuous" 29 and, in
some cases, be in writing as wel1. 21 This requirement is designed so that a
reasonable man will recognize the extent of the commitment which he has
made. Section 2-316 thus protects the buyer from the seller's concealed at-
tempts to shirk his legal obligations in contrast to the less stringent provisions
of the U.S.A., which more readily allowed the disclaiming of warranties. 22
Further to deter unfair dealings, the courts have been granted by the Code
"police powers" to refuse enforcement of a contract, or any of its clauses,
which are found to be "unconscionable." 22 The comments following section
2-302 indicate that the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise are the
principles to be followed in making this determination and that the total
commercial setting must be considered. 24 Initially there was criticism of
section 2-302, particularly because of the Code's failure to define uncon-
19 Id.
17 Sec Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter 	 § 15(1), (4), (5).
U.C.C.la 	 § 2-316(1). See also U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
19 Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Product Cases, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 974, 993 (1966). Certain obligations are imposed on the
buyer by § 2-316(3)(a), (b), (c). For example, a warranty will be excluded if the buyer
ignores language such as "with all faults," which should call the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties. If the buyer examines or refuses to examine the goods, provided
that he has the opportunity to do so before entering into the contract, a warranty will
not be implied as to the defects discoverable by a reasonable inspection. Moreover, custom,
the course of dealings or course of performance can also exclude or modify an implied
warranty.
29 U.C.C.	 1-201(10) defines conspicuous: "A term or clause is conspicuous when
it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it... ."
21 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
22 There was no formulated procedure under the U.S.A. by which a warranty could
be excluded or modified. The only provision covering this matter is U.S.A. § 71 which
rather broadly asserts:
Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale
by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by
the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as
to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.
However, see also, Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L.
Rev. 117, 157-168 (1943), where it is noted that courts often looked with a jaundiced eye
upon the seller's efforts to limit his responsibilities, and required that a disclaimer be
brought to the attention of the buyer before it would be enforced.
23 See U.C.C. § 2-302.
24 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
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scionability, 25
 and it was feared that confusion and inconsistency would
be the results of applying this section. 28
 However, the fears of the critics have
proved to be unjustified as decisions have developed in a unified pattern 27
following the guidelines set forth in the Code. 28 Thus section 2-302 seems to
protect the legitimate interests of both buyer and seller.
Section 2-318 sets forth those persons who shall receive warranty pro-
tection in personal injury cases. Absent privity of contract, pre-Code
courts were reluctant to allow parties the right to sue. 29
 The draftsmen
recognized that unjust results often were reached under the strict privity
requirements. The 1949 proposed draft of the Code would have effectively
abolished the concept of privity by extending the seller's warranty for personal
injuries and property damages to those "whose relationship to the buyer is
such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person 3° might use the
defective goods." Ultimately the Code reached the position that privity would
not be required for certain specified persons.31
 Beyond those specifically
enumerated beneficiaries of warranty protection, the Code expressly enunciates
a neutral position.32
Tn products liability cases, the privity question is a key element in the
growing confrontation between the application of the Code and the application
of strict Iiability,in tort, as established by Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts." Tn reality, both a warranty theory and strict liability
25
 See Comment, Unconscionahility—the Code, the Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 367 (1968).
28
 Id. at 369.
27
 Id. at 378.
28 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
28
 The principle was established in an old English case, Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), that no duty was owed to a person not a party to the
contract. This requirement was followed in an innumerable number of cases, particularly
to shield the manufacturer from liability. For a comprehensive study of the erosion of
the privity fortress, see Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Prosser, The Fail of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966). The food cases such as Jacob E. Decker & Sons
v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942), first broke the privity barrier. This result
was later extended to non-food cases. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See Donovan, supra note 7 at 219.
30
 The 1949 draft of § 2-318 was derived from § 43, Uniform Revised Sales Act
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
31 U.C.C. 1 2-318 extends warranty protection to "any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods. . . ." It is beyond the
scope of this comment to discuss the court interpretations of "family," "guest," etc. See,
e.g., Donovan, supra note 7, at 220-24; Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Section 2-318, 68 Dick. L. Rev. 444 (1964) ; Comment, Product
Liability—Application of the Word "Family" as Used in Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. In-
cluded Nephew of Purchaser, 12 N.Y.L.F. 530 (1966).
32 U.C.C. 2 -318, Comment 3.
33 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965) asserts that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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reach the same result." However, section 402A refuses to be hampered by
the technicalities of sales law. 35 Although it would seem that there are factual
situations where strict liability in tort is preferable to a warranty theory
(for example, a non-commercial setting where a remote user incurs a physical
injury), it is submitted that strict liability has been adopted in cases where
the Code also could have provided effective relief. 3° Commenting upon this
development one author notes the paradox of two parallel theories, warranty
and strict liability, reaching the same result (absolute liability), and using the
same standard (defectiveness). 37 Another writer has voiced his irritation with
judicial decisions superseding legislative enactments." Although favoring
the ends often reached by applying strict liability, he submits that a unified
system is needed and that such could be realized through amendment of the
Code." Taking a contrary position, a commentator contends that both the
Code and section 402A have a useful role to play in products liability. 40 The
Code, he argues, is suited to handle commercial transactions between com-
mercial parties, but the law of sales has no application in personal injury
suits.47 Although a distinction based on the kind of injury incurred finds sup-
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
34 See the following articles and cases cited therein: Littlefield, Some Thoughts on
Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor Shanker, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 10 (1966) ;
Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 692 (1965); Shanker,
Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Com-
mentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W.
Res. L. Rev. 5 (1965).
35 Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes § 402(a), comment m at 356
(1965) expressly indicates:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is
not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limita-
tion to "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to
give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurs,
as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of action does not
depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires
the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether
it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying
the product into the consumer's hands. In short, "warranty" must be given a
new and different meaning if it is to be used in connection with this Section. It
is much simpler to regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability
in tort.
36 See, for example, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
where, in a strictly commercial transaction where buyer's damages were out of pocket
losses, strict liability in tort was adopted.
Rapson, supra note 34.
ss Shanker, supra note 34 at 8-11.
" Id. at 39-47, where the author proposes changes and clarification in the Code.
10 Littlefield, supra note 34.
41 Id. at 18-20.
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port among courts, 42 section 2-318 neither requires nor supports such a posi-
tion. The wording of section 2-318 grants warranty protection to persons who
"may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who [are] injured in per-
son by breach of the warranty." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, it would seem
that the nature of the injury received should not be solely determinative in
the choice between the Code and section 402A. Rather, along with privity, the
setting and the relative bargaining positions of the parties should be one
of the elements to be considered.
II. PRE-CODE TREATMENT OF WARRANTIES IN NON-SALE SITUATIONS
Pre-Code courts often displayed a reluctance to extend warranty protec-
tion to transactions which deviated from the traditional sale. Rather than
determining whether the facts of a given contract justified the imposition of a
warranty, these courts attempted to classify the transaction as a sale or a
non-sale, often finding that no sale was present and therefore refusing to grant
warranty protection, 43
One area where there has been little support for extending warranty
protection to the non-sale transaction is the contract in which a service
element is present. These are of two kinds: the pure service contract where
professional advice or guidance is the consideration sought, and the mixed
contract, where a service element is present, but goods are transferred as
well. Generally, in pure service contracts only express warranties have been
enforced.44 This result is considered justifiable because (1) it was not within
the reasonable expectations of the parties that a given goal could be guaran-
teed; (2) the parties bargained for services not results; and (3) the existence
of variables not within the servicer's control would put an unjust and undue
burden on him if he were required to warrant a given result. However, in
Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co.,45 the court held that an engineering contractor
impliedly warrants that the plans and specifications submitted for a housing
project are fit for the purposes for which they were intended. In so doing, the
court did not refute the proposition that a servicer should not be obligated
to guarantee the results in pure service contracts. On the contrary, it is sub-
mitted that the court recognized that a modification of this rule should be
effectuated when the scarcity of elements beyond the servicer's control makes
it highly unlikely that the benefits of the contract cannot be produced. For
42 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), where Chief
Justice Traynor, whose opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962), served as a catalyst to the adoption of § 402A, contended that
§ 402A and the U.C.C. are consistent and complementary. The Code should be applied only
when monetary-business damages are at issue, while § 402A should reign in the personal
injury field. But see also, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965),
where strict liability in tort was applied when property damages were incurred.
43 See Farnsworth, supra note 3 at 663-664. The author notes that American courts
have followed the "essence" test adopted by the English courts. This test classified a
service-good contract as a service or a sale depending on whether the work or the ma-
terials supplied was the essence of the agreement.
44 Comment, Contract Formation and the Law of Warranty: A Broader Use of the
Code, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 81, 87 (1966) ; see Note, Implied Warranties in Service
Contracts, 39 Notre Dame Law. 680, 682-84 (1964).
45 275 Ala. 35, 151 So.2d 767 (1963).
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example, the court noted that in medicine and the law, factors beyond the
practitioner's power to regulate make the imposition of a warranty unjust. In
medicine, the court proceeds, the reaction of a patient to a drug or to surgery,
are variables which cannot be readily predicted. Similarly, it is an undue
burden to make a lawyer warrant the outcome of a case. In concluding that
the defendant-contractor warrants that he will convey a reasonably accurate
survey, the court noted the absence of unknown or uncontrollable topo-
graphical or landscape conditions which could prevent the adequate perfor-
mance of his services." Hence, the nature of the servicer's profession and the
circumstances in which the particular services are to be rendered are the
factors to be considered in the determination whether an implied warranty
is in order.
A mixed service contract differs from a pure service contract in that a
mixed contract involves the transfer of goods along with the performing of a
service.47 The question then arises whether a warranty should attach to the
goods supplied or used in a mixed contract. Despite the close analogy to sales
transactions, in the absence of express warranties, pre-Code courts con-
sistently failed to apply warranties to this kind of service contract. In Foley
Corp. v. Dove" plaintiff corporation was building a drive-in theatre and
hired defendant to construct an enclosure which would keep out the lights of
the highway. When the building ultimately collapsed, plaintiff sued for
damages on a warranty theory under the U.S.A. Despite the fact that only
the presence of a service element distinguished this transaction from a sale,
the court refused to extend warranty protection to the building constructed
and purchased. The court reasoned that a construction contract, where the
furnishing of materials is only incidental to the work and labor performed,
does not come within the purview of the warranties of the U.S.A.° Even in
Code states, courts have continued this categorization of transactions, and,
as if the rule were self-evident, have refused to apply sales warranties to
situations where a service element is an integral part of the contract.°
Blood transfusion cases represent another aspect of the service-sale issue.
Courts have consistently held that supplying blood in a hospital is part of
the services provided and is not a sale. 51 Duesenberg and King argue that
48 Id. at 40, 151 So.2d at 772.
41 Comment, Contract Formation and the Law of Warranty: A Broader Use of the
Code, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 81, 87 (1966).
48 101 A.2d 841 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954),
49 Id. at 842.
59 See Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963), where a
warranty was not extended to the materials applied in a beauty parlor treatment; and,
Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex, 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1966), where
the parts replaced in a movie camera, as part of a repair contract, were not warranted.
However, a recent New Jersey decision, Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279
(App. Div. 1968), reached the contrary result on a set of facts similar to those in Epstein,
the logic of which decision was expressly rejected. The court reasoned that the applica-
tion of warranties should be determined by the elements necessitating their imposition,
rather than the specific nature of the transaction,
51 Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F.2d 105 (D. Colo. 1964) ; Balkowitsch v.
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn, 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965) ; Perl-
mutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). But see Jackson v.
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these decisions were based on policy grounds rather than logic, 52
 since the
courts were troubled by the inability of hospitals to protect themselves by
discovering the defect in the blood furnished to the patients. Hospitals, it
was felt, should not bear the risks for a disease-ridden blood supply to which
its negligence did not contribute. The authors contend that it is unreasonable
to argue that a recipient of a transfusion is not purchasing the blood supplied,
as this item is clearly accounted for in the hospital bill. In any event, it is
argued that reasoning by analogy to the law of sales should result in the
extension of warranty provisions to the blood provided."
III. WARRANTIES AS APPLIED TO LEASES
It has been noted that only the contemplated future return of the chat-
tel distinguishes a lease from a sale.54
 Moreover, the same business ends often
can be reached in a lease as in a sale.55
 Yet, because a lease is not technically
a sale, the same problems of extending warranty protection are present as
existed in the previously discussed non-sale situations. An analysis of pre-
Code decisions reveals that courts were more receptive to bringing leases
within the confines of warranty protection when the chattel was in the nature
of a dangerous instrumentality, or one to which considerable danger could
attach if defective." Implicit in the decisions extending warranty protection
to leases is a recognition that those elements which justified the imposition
of warranties in sales cases are present in lease transactions as well." For
example; in Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co.,58 a third party defendant-
contractor was held liable on common Iaw warranty principles for leasing
a defective part to the plaintiff. The elements of reliance on the com-
petence of the lessor-contractor, his ability to bear the risk and the dangers
inherent in providing a defective article were cited to support the lessor's
liability and affirm the application of sales warranties in this non-sale trans-
action." In contrast, there is authority for the proposition that the lessor's
liability is contingent upon a negligent failure to provide goods fit for the
Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (L. Div. 1967), where the court did
find a sale.
52
 Duesenberg & King, supra note 7, at § 7.0112] 1.b] I i
53
 See also Comment, Blood Transfusions and the Warranty Provisions of the Code,
9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 943 (1968).
54 Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 655.
55
 Vold, supra note 3, at 84.
58
 Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958) (defec-
tive ship part); Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E.2d 342 (1923)
(defective crane) ; Gambino v. John Lucas & Co., 263 App. Div. 1054, 34 N.Y.S.2d 383
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (defective gas tank) ; Standard Oil Co. of New York, 231 App. Div. 101,
246 N.Y.S. 142 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (defective storage tank) ; Thomson Spot Welder Co. v.
The Dickelman Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio App. 270 (1921) (defective electric welding machine) ;
Dufort v. Smith, 53 Pa. D. & C. 307 (1944) (defective airplane).
87 See 2 F. Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts § 28:19, where the following are
given as reasons for imposing warranties on the seller: (1) one party is in a better posi-
tion to know the antecedents that affect the quality of the goods; (2) to control these
conditions; and (3) to distribute the loss.
58 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958).
5 t) Id. at 314.
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purposes intended." It would seem that the requirement of negligence is
more often found in cases where the article, if defective, is not likely to
produce a significant degree of harm to the lessee.°' However, even in cases
involving dangerous instrumentalities, such as motor vehicles, it has been held
that the lessor need only exercise reasonable care to avoid liability."
With the developing responsibilities imposed upon the seller of goods,
courts have turned away from the negligence doctrine and have begun to assert
that the risk of harm from defective goods should be borne by the one who
puts such an article into the stream of commerce rather than by the person
injured by it." A landmark decision was Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and
Rental Sen.,'" which indicates the need for consumer protection in the ex-
panding area of leasing and rental concerns. 65 Cintrone holds that public
policy demands that the lessee, as well as the buyer of automobiles, be pro-
tected against injuries from defective component parts. As it was essentially
decided on common law principles of strict liability and breach of warranty,
Cintrone cannot be cited as a Code case. However, Comment 2 to section
2-313" is mentioned in the court's opinion and the rationale of Cintrone is
consistent with Code principles.
In concluding that sales warranties should be extended to leases, the
court in Cintrone indicated that the elements of consumer reliance, the superior
ability of one party to control the quality of the product and to bear the risk
of harm, if defective, are common to both lease and sale situations. The court
observed that when one is put into the driver's seat "the relationship between
the parties fairly calls for an implied warranty of fitness for use, at least equal
to that assumed by a new car manufacturer. The content of such warranty
must be that the car will not fail mechanically during the rental period."67
The fact that the court seemed to emphasize the dangerous nature of
automobiles in its reasoning raises the question whether the nature of the
00 McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P.2d 810 (1953) ; Milestone System v.
Gasior, 160 Md. 131, 152 A. 810 (1931) ; Mitchell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 189 N.E. 39
(1934) ; Smith v. Pabst, 233 Wis. 489, 288 N.W. 780 (1939); Vaningan v. Mueller, 208
Wis. 527, 243 N.W. 419 (1932).
61 Smith v. Pabst, 233 Wis. 489, 288 N.W. 780 (1939) (horse rental) ; Vaningan v.
Mueller, 203 Wis. 527, 243 N.W. 419 (1932) (horse rental).
02 McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P.2d 810 (1953) (rented tractor) ;
Milestone System v. Gasior, 160 Md. 131, 152 A. 810 (1931) (rented automobile) ; Mit-
chell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 189 N.E. 39 (1934) (rented automobile).
63 See note 29 supra and the accompnying discussion regarding the decline of lack
of privity as a bar.
64 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
65 Id, at 448, 212 A.2d at 776.
66 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2 provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties
made by the seller as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined to either sales con-
tracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appro-
priate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
01 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 449-50, 212 A.2d
769, 777 (1965).
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chattel will ultimately determine whether the lessee will receive warranty
protection. Significantly, Cintrone's reasoning was found inapplicable in
three cases which subsequently reached the New Jersey Superior Court level:
Magrine v. Krasnica,°8
 Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp.," and Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hosp.70
 The court's reasoning in the latter two cases is relevant
to the issue at hand.
Arguing on the basis of Cintrone, the plaintiff in the Conroy case con-
tended, on common law principles, that an implied warranty of fitness should
be extended to the lease of an apartment. The New Jersey Superior Court
rejected this contention and stated that Cintrone was applicable only to the
mass producer or lessor. There was no indication, the court asserted, that
warranties were to be applied to transactions involving isolated sales or leases.
In the Jackson case, the issue was whether a warranty of fitness should
be extended to blood transfusions. Plaintiff sued on both a breach of warranty
under the Code and strict liability in tort. Though the court found a sale,"
it clearly distinguished the sale of blood from the leasing of cars on policy
grounds. It indicated that the dangers inherent in the leasing of a malfunc-
tioning car, and the ability of the lessor to know and to control this condition,
were not present in the sale of blood. Accordingly, strict liability in tort was
not applied. As the seller's warranties were deemed to have been effectively
disclaimed, plaintiff was denied recovery on the warranty count as well: 72
One may conclude that Cintrone, Conroy and Jackson stand for the
proposition that the specific qualities of the good and the position of the
lessor in the market (i.e., whether the lessor is a mass dealer with respect to
the goods rented), are key factors to be considered when the problem of apply-
ing sales warranties to non-sales situations arises. It has been pointed out"
that, although the Cintrone court cited several New York cases as pre-
cedent for its decision, it failed to discuss Covello v. State" where the state;
the lessor of roller skates at a public arena, was held liable for negligence and
for breaching a common law warranty of fitness. It may be asked why, if
Covello was not cited because it did not deal with a dangerous instrumentality,
68 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d .539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967). In this case, which
makes only brief reference to the Code, the defendant was a dentist who was sued by his
patient in strict liability in tort when a needle being used by the defendant broke in
plaintiff's jaw. The court could find no relationship at all between a dentist, who is not
a supplier but provides a service, and a volume-producing lessor of cars. Hence, the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant should bear the risk for harm resulting in the
course of his business was rejected. Such a burden, the court felt, should be imposed
only upon an enterprise which can effectively spread the risk.
02 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1967).
70 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (L. Div. 1967).
71 Jackson is the first case which has held that a transfusion does constitute a sale.
In essence, the result of this case, like Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E.2d 792 (1954), which Jackson expressly refutes, is that negligence is required in
blood transfusion suits, provided that the disclaimer is deemed reasonable. See 47 Neb.
L. Rev. 166 (1968).
72 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 329, 232 A.2d 879, 888 (L. Div.
1967). The court considered that the disclaiming of liability for any harm by labels so
indicating on each bottle was reasonable.
73 Note, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 144, 150-151 (1966). 	 •
74 17 Misc, 2d 637, 187 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
136
WARRANTY PROTECTION
that case was not distinguished on this ground. 75 It may be inferred from
this omission that Cintrone did not necessarily limit its holding to a leased
chattel of a dangerous nature. Rather, it may be argued that implicit in
Cintrone's failure to mention Covello is the recognition that the mechanical
components of the goods are not the only critical factors because any article,
if defective, can cause harm. It would seem, particularly in the light of the
further clarification of Cintrone provided by the Jackson and Conroy cases,
that such an implication is unwarranted. Nonetheless, although they are an
important consideration, it is submitted that the inherent qualities of the
chattel should not be solely determinative, but rather should constitute one
of the elements in the total commercial setting to be evaluated.
A corollary to the proposition that a lessor should warrant the goods
rented is the argument that the financial burden caused by defective products
should be borne by the "enterprise" in the course of whose business the
damages arise. In this way the lessor is compelled either to sustain all Tosses
or to spread the risk by purchasing insurance or by passing these costs on to
the consumer in higher prices. Hertz Rent A Car is an illustration of the kind
of large-scale enterprise which can readily bear the economic burdens caused
by defective goods. It is conceded, however, that many smaller-sized leasing
firms might not be in a better position than the lessee to bear these financial
costs. It is submitted that the extent to which the lessor can distribute the
loss is certainly of significance in deciding whether the circumstances merit
the application of warranty principles.
The reliance element is another factor to be considered in deciding
whether a lessor will be obligated to warrant the quality of his goods. Cintrone
indicates that a lessor's aggressive advertising can indeed induce reliance by
the lessee. It has been contended that the reliance of the lessee exceeds that
of the buyer: " [I] t is generally true that the bailee for hire spends less time
shopping for the article than he would in selecting like goods to be purchased,
and since the item is not one which he expects to own, he will usually be less
competent in judging its quality."'" It has been further argued that the
lessee's reliance is greater in short-term leases than when a chattel is to be
rented for a long period of time. 77 The explanation is that the needs of a
lessee who desires to rent a car for a day or a weekend would generally re-
quire immediate satisfaction. He is likely to have neither the time nor the
patience to look extensively for a car, and consequently he has no choice but
to rely on the ability of the lessor to furnish him with a vehicle which will be
adequate for his purposes. Therefore, the argument for warranty protection
under such circumstances is stronger.
A further important aspect of the reliance element is the relative bargain-
ing positions of the parties and the terms of the contract resulting therefrom.
As stated previously, the Code reserves the right to the seller to exclude or
modify warranties" so long as the buyer is adequately notified of such
7:1 Note, supra note 73, at 150 n.31.
78 Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 673-74.
7 Comment, supra note 44, at 91.
78 U.C.C. § 2-316. See the discussion accompanying notes 18-28 supra.
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limitations." A recent Arkansas decision, Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp.,"
found that the disclaimer and unconscionability clauses were equally ap-
plicable in sale and lease situations. Accordingly, it was held that the war-
ranties of Article 2 should be applied to leases "where the provisions of the
lease are analogous to a sale." 81 The Sawyer case is significant for, unlike
Cintrone, the decision is based entirely on the Code. However, the court's hold-
ing that warranties should be applied to leases "where the provisions of the
lease are analogous to a sale" raises some questions of interpretation. It would
seem that this language is somewhat restrictive, suggesting a certain re-
luctance to extend the warranty protection. It is submitted that the approach
of the court is in error. The needs of the lessee rather than the extent to which
the terms of a lease contract resemble those of a sale should be the critical
factor in determining whether a warranty should be imposed. It is contended
that Sawyer would be far more valuable as precedent if it had unequivocally
asserted that warranties should be extended to lease arrangements whenever
the circumstances justifying their imposition are present. In this way, the
underlying reasons for applying warranty principles to leases, rather than the
specific details of the contract, would be the relevant factors to be considered.
The dissenting judge points out that the majority opinion fails to provide any
guidelines or standards to be followed. Specifically, he questions when a
lease is "analogous to a sale" and whether such terms of the lease agreement
(as the disposition of the leased chattel at the end of the rental period) are
to determine if a lessee will receive warranty protection. For example, he
asserts, "I am unable to discern how we will be able to decide the application
of code provisions to leases on a section by section basis in the absence of
clear statutory intent."82 It is submitted that the dissent's criticisms are in
order. The majority has proposed a general standard" without analyzing
and setting forth the elements necessary to permit the application of the
Code's warranties to leases. Nonetheless, the criticism by the dissent in no
way negates or undermines the fact ' that circumstances in lease situations
often do require that a warranty be implied. As has been suggested, Sawyer
could and should have adopted a standard whereby the imposition of war-
ranties in leases would depend not on the provisions of the transaction, but
rather on the presence of those factors which justify placing the burden for
defective goods on the lessor. The proposition further can be drawn from the
dissent that the majority has extended warranty protection to a transaction
79 Id.
99 — Ark. —, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968). The action was brought by the appellee,
Pioneer Leasing Corporation, to recover for default of payments totaling $2,039.40 for
the rental of an ice machine. Appellant was an independent grocer. The terms of the lease
transaction contained a term whereby the appellant assumed the risk completely for any
defects in the machine, Because of this disclaimer, a verdict was directed in the trial
court for the lessor-corporation. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and con-
cluded that a new trial was needed to determine whether the disclaimer clause in the
lease contract met the standards set forth in § 2-316(2) of the Code.
81 Id. at —, 428 S.W.2d at 54.
82 Id. at —, 428 S.W.2d at 56.
83 Id. at —, 428 S.W.2d at 54. The standard set forth is that the Code's sale




not envisioned by the Code. The confusion resulting from this development,
the dissenting judge feels, has defeated the purpose of making uniform the
commercial laws of the various states. It would seem that Justice Fogleman
is unduly concerned with the uniformity of the law of sales which the enact-
ment of the Code was undoubtedly designed to foster. In particular, his com-
ment that he found "nothing in the Commercial Code which remotely suggests
that it has any such application [to leases of personal property] "S' seems
inconsistent with section 1-102 which clearly encourages the evolutionary
development of the commercial law by the courts. It is submitted that the
Code can reasonably be expanded to include warranties in lease situations.
Section 1-102 of the Code sets forth guidelines to its interpretations:
"This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies." 85 Modernization 86 and expansion87 of the commercial
law, along with uniformity,88 are then outlined as the keys to construing
the Code. A commentator submits that:
No longer is the primary aim merely uniformity with prior Iaw
and practice, however obsolescent. . . . Devotion to uniformity with
the receding and perhaps obsolescent past.shall not under Code law
interfere unduly with present evolutionary growth with its focus on
current changing and foreseeable needs of buy .ers.89
The Comments to the Code further indicate, "It is intended to make it possible
for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light
of unforeseen and new circumstances. . . ." 9° After citing several Code sales
cases where an interpretation consistent with the broader view encouraged
by the Code was taken, the Comments note, "Nothing in this Act stands
in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts." 91 Therefore, the
Code, by its own terms, has dictated that a uniformity expanded by the
necessity of growth is the standard to be followed. Writers have shed addi-
tional light on the interpretation of the Code by the observation that liberal
construction under the Code means that "[u] nIess a given construction or
application in determining a particular dispute clearly contravenes the
statute, either by commission or omission, courts should not defer to the
legislature for a change in the rules." 92 It has been argued further, "One
may reasonably conclude that the intent of the drafters of Section 2-313 of the
Uniform Commercial Code was to pave the way for decisions which would
recognize the sales analogy in bailment cases. These indications of legislative
intent should and will be of great importance to the determination of this issue
84 Id. at —, 428 S.W.2d at 54.
85 U.C.C. § 1 - 102(1).
88
 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a).
87
 See U.C.C. § 1-102 (2) (b) .
88 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (c).
89
 Vold, Construing the Uniform Commercial Code: Its Own Twin Keys: Uni-
formity and Growth, 50 Cornell L.Q. 49, 62 (1964).
U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
91 Id.
92 W. Willier & F. Hart, Forms and Procedures under the U.C.C. JJ 12;03[1] (1966).
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in states where the Code is adopted." 93 The Code's capacity for growth finds
support not only in the guidelines to its interpretation, but in the encourage-
ment given by the draftsmen that the Code be extended to non-sale trans-
actions under appropriate circumstances." For example, a student commenta-
tor notes that section 2-313. Comment 2 indicates that the policies concerning
express warranties as to sales might aid courts in dealing with similar cir-
cumstances, such as bailments for hire. 93 The conclusion reached is that the
Code "is an example par excellence of a statute that is appropriate for use as
a premise for reasoning,"99 In support of this proposition, it has been reasoned
that "while rented goods are not 'sold,' a property interest short of 'title'
is transferred as in a sale and the transaction is in the nature of a bargain.
Thus, . . • warranties . . . could logically accompany the transaction." 97
IV. CONCLUSION
•
This comment has indicated that a liberal construction of the Code allows
the extension of Code warranties to leases under appropriate circumstances.
Hence, though uniformity is one of its foundations, it is important to remem-
ber that the Code contains an inherent potential and prescription for growth
to meet changing commercial conditions and needs. It was previously stated
that the confrontation between the Code and section 402A is increasing and
that strict liability has been adopted when the Code also could have provided
an adequate remedy." Similarly, it is submitted that the relief which section
402A provides the lessee should not be preferred in every lease situation to
the warranty protection under the Code. Indeed, in a commercial setting,
where both the lessor and the lessee are businessmen, circumstances not only
justify but demand that the Code be applied. The inappropriateness of apply-
ing section 402A under these circumstances can be illustrated by the fact
that strict liability cannot be disclaimed, yet basic to a commercial transaction
is the seller's right to bargain and to shift the responsibilities for defects in
leased goods.
It has been asserted further that those factors which justify the im-
position of warranties in sales cases are often found in lease transactions.
These are: (a) public policy which requires that the party which puts goods
into the stream of commerce should bear the risk of harm caused by defective
goods, rather than the person injured by it; (b) the fact that one party has
induced the reliance of the consumer on his skill and knowledge; (c) the
93 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 144, 147 (1966).
94 See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 880, 887 (1965). See also Duesenberg & King, supra note 7, at § 7.01
[21[b), where the authors note that "in the absence of any prohibitory provision, the
court could simply say that if the warranty is good enough for a sale, it is good enough
for a lease. .. ." The possibility is also raised that § 2-102 which uses the phrase "trans-
actions in goods" might include leases. However, the authors note that § 2-314 restricts
warranty coverage to sales, and the fact that the service of food is singled out for pro-
tection suggests that warranties were not meant to be applied so generally.
011 Note, supra note 94, at 887.
06 Id.
Willier & Hart, supra note 92, at ¶1 12:02111 (1966).
as See the discussion accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
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fact that the former is in a better position to control the antecedents which
affect the quality of the product; and (d) the fact that he is better able
to distribute the loss. However, it is contended that a rule which holds, with-
out exception, that a lessee should receive the Code warranty protection af-
forded to the buyer, should be rejected. The explanation is that the Code
warranty provisions do not attach to a lease transaction as a matter of law.
Thus, while a buyer need only prove that a defective product was conveyed at
the time of sale, the total commercial setting of a rental must be evaluated in
the determination whether it is equitable that a lessor be held to warrant his
goods. It is concluded that the absence of obligatory statutory coverage
allows the extension of warranty protection to the lessee to be determined
by a more flexible standard, one capable of being adjusted in each case to
meet the needs and interests of both the lessor and the lessee. It would
seem, nonetheless, that there are factual situations in which it is hardly dis-
putable that the responsibilities of a seller should be imposed on the lessor as
well."" This conclusion depends largely on one basic consideration—the nature
of the lessor's enterprise—for this matter reaches the issues of the relative
market positions of the parties and the degree of the lessee's reliance. If the
lessor is a merchant'°° with respect to the goods leased he should warrant
their fitness. This result will be reinforced if the goods involved are in the
nature of a dangerous instrumentality, or one to which considerable danger
could attach if they prove defective. Indeed, the lessor, by holding himself
out to the public as knowledgeable in a given field (by advertising and/or
simply by being a merchant), has led the lessee to rely reasonably upon his
skill and judgment. Moreover, it would be more equitable to impose upon the
lessor-merchant, rather than the lessee, the financial risk of defective products,
as he is more likely to be able to bear these costs and to distribute the loss.
Perhaps every case will not reflect these conclusions as convincingly as the
facts in Cintrone. Leasing concerns do vary in size and economic maturity.
Nonetheless, the presumption should be that an enterprise-lessor can and
should be responsible for damages resulting from non-merchantable goods
which he rents. The lessor who holds himself out to the public as knowledge-
able in a given field should assume the risks of harm, rather than the lessee
who relies on this expertise. Therefore, in the absence of a conspicuous dis-
claimer the lessor-merchant, as his seller counterpart, should be held to the
obligations of section 2-314.
The proposition that the Iessor-merchant should impliedly warrant the
chattel leased should not be extended to cases where the lessor is not a
merchant with respect to the goods leased but merely makes an isolated lease.
Several factors distinguish this latter situation from the relationship between
the lessor-merchant and lessee. These are: (a) the lack of justifiable reliance
on the non-merchant lessor's skill and knowledge; (b) the lessor's more
limited ability to spread the risk; and (c) the more equal bargaining posi-
tions of the parties. Nevertheless, even in the isolated lease situation, it seems
equitable to imply a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when the
90 See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965).
100 See U.C.C. § 2-104.
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lessor has reason to know that the lessee is relying on his skill or judgment
to select goods for him."I
Implying warranties in lease situations should in no way restrict the
lessor from making use of the right to disclaim allowed by section 2-316.
However, any exclusions or modifications of the lessor's obligation must con-
form to the criteria set forth by the Code. Indeed, because of the similarities
of the interests to be protected, the courts should be equally wary in a lease
of any unfair dealings and freely use their powers under section 2-302 when-
ever the lessor unduly takes advantage of his superior bargaining position.
For example, if the lessor were able to disclaim at will all warranties in the
short-term lease situation, the lessee would be sorely disadvantaged.
At a time when consumers in increasing numbers are leasing rather than
purchasing goods of various kinds, commercial realities require that warranty
protection be afforded to the lessee under appropriate circumstances. It is
clear that the purposes and policies of the Code permit and encourage this
development, and that sound public policy requires continued use of the
Code as a basis for judicial reasoning.
WILLARD H. KRASNOW
tot Applying these standards in a lease situation essentially mirrors the warranties
imposed in sales situations by U.C.C. § 2-31.5.
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